Severin Marty, ProClim: Just to clarify: What exactly is the difference between the popular initiative and the indirect counterproposal?
Jochen Markard: Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, the Federal Council decided to no longer approve any new nuclear power plants (NPPs). For this reason, an article (12a) was added to the Nuclear Energy Act in 2016, prohibiting new framework permits for NPPs. The indirect counterproposal aims to repeal this ban. The Blackout Initiative is more complex: it seeks to enshrine in the Constitution that the electricity supply is guaranteed at all times. The federal government is to define the responsibilities for this. In addition, the initiative emphasizes that all climate-friendly forms of electricity supply should be permitted. This aims to lift the ban on new nuclear power plants. Key differences are thus the explicit responsibility of the federal government and an implicit ban on fossil fuel-fired power plants through the initiative.
“If all obstacles are overcome without delay, commissioning is not expected until 2050 at the earliest.”
You are a co-author of the report “Prospects for Nuclear Energy in Switzerland”. The report outlines the timeline for the construction and licensing process of a new nuclear power plant through to commissioning. When would this be the earliest, or rather, when is it most realistic? Could an accelerated licensing procedure theoretically be possible for nuclear power plants?
We have identified seven critical points in this regard: the votes on the Blackout Initiative and the counter-proposal (1) as well as on the EU electricity agreement (2), a law on subsidising a new nuclear power plant including a possible referendum (3), decisions by potential operators and investors (4), the granting of the framework licence including a possible referendum (5), the building permit including possible objections (6), as well as construction and finally the start of operations (7). Each of these steps is associated with significant uncertainties.
A ‘no’ vote on just one of the key decisions could halt the entire process. Overall, the process takes a long time. A diagram in our report illustrates this clearly (see diagram below). If all hurdles are overcome without delay, commissioning is expected no earlier than 2050. However, the process could also take significantly longer, or, as mentioned, fail altogether. In theory, new laws could be enacted to speed up the process, but that is pure speculation at this stage.
Why does the report not provide a similar analysis for small reactors?
Our report focuses on ‘conventional’ large nuclear power plants as we know them today (Generation III/III+). These have been technically proven and there is experience available from various countries. We do not have this experience with small reactors. There are a few individual plants in operation for specific purposes – such as a small reactor on a barge supplying a town in the Arctic in Russia. There are also projects involving novel reactor designs, but many of these are still at the planning stage. The uncertainties are still so great, both technologically and financially, that they are unlikely to play a role in decisions to be made in the coming years.
“If a large power station were to fail here, our integration into the EU electricity grid ensures that the lights do not go out. The EU electricity agreement offers this security in the future as well.”
You mentioned the EU electricity agreement. What role does it play in relation to the construction of new nuclear power plants?
If you operate a large nuclear power plant today, you absolutely need a back-up in case the plant fails unexpectedly. We saw this most recently at Gösgen. The plant was shut down for ten months and could only be restarted in March. In such cases, we can currently rely on the European electricity grid. If we reject the EU electricity agreement, it is unclear whether we will still have this safety net in the future. In the worst-case scenario, we would have to build national reserve power stations.
